![]() Worse, every ounce of political capital spent on the generals is an ounce stolen from the Sudanese citizens who are still pursuing their country’s transformation. Courting the belligerents to make peace only legitimizes them as the primary protagonists in deciding Sudan’s future, right when they are brutally destroying it. While violence escalates and civilians bear the brunt in horrific and targeted ways, failed cease-fires come and go. Now, peacemakers are repeating the same mistakes. Four years after a nonviolent popular uprising drove dictator Omar al-Bashir from power, a series of neat peacemaking blueprints kept two generals-Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed “Hemeti” Hamdan Dagalo, who had cut their teeth under Bashir-in control of the state until they violently fell out with each other and tore the country apart. Seasoned belligerents are adept at navigating peacemakers’ road maps, frameworks, and milestones such that they come out intact and stay on top. Such deals can silence the guns for a time, but they often shore up troublemakers’ grip on power, making hollow their commitments to real political change. Securing cease-fires and power-sharing deals to end violence is seductive. It too often rewards violence and undervalues civil politics. Secure a cease-fire to end violence, fasten it down with interim power-sharing among armed actors, roll out a timetable for institutional (security, economic, constitutional) reform, and then bring in civil actors toward the end goal of democratic elections. ![]() ![]() The standard peacemaking formula is deceptively neat. ![]()
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